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JDA. The customer for the JDIB is, in essence, limited to the JDA due to the country’s 
unique circumstances. The Japanese government has tried to help the JDIB in various 
ways. The Japanese government has created demand for the JDIB through high 
procurement costs, and the JDIB has maintained defense divisions and improved its 
technological expertise.  
The research goal is to identify some key political and economic factors to allow 
the JDIB to continue. This thesis describes the characteristics of the JDIB and the current 
circumstances surrounding the JDIB, and evaluates factors that influence continued 
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This research will be useful to Japanese government officials and corporate 
decision-makers within the Japanese Defense Industry Base (JDIB) in formulating an 
overall management strategy for the Japanese Defense Industry in the 21st century. The 
research goal is to identify some key political and economic factors to allow the JDIB to 
continue in the current environment.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Defense-related expenditures for FY01 total 4.9388 trillion yen, a 17.1 billion yen 
increase over the previous fiscal year but real growth, taking into account price increases 
and other factors, is zero and this trend of almost zero growth in defense spending, has 
been observed since FY94 and is expected to continue into the near future. 
The Japanese Defense Industry has been developing and producing acceptable 
quality of equipment for the Self Defense Forces (SDF). The systems arming the SDF 
that develop and produce the equipment have been supported economically and 
politically and are willing to support a costly yet modest defense industry not dependent 
on exports for survival. However, the Japanese Defense Industry Base is currently facing 
severe hardships due to the end of the Cold War and prolonged economic difficulties, and 
therefore, must change the way it does business. 
In addition to economic difficulties lasting almost a decade, the policy limiting 
defense spending to less then 1% of Japan’s GDP also makes the situation in the JDIB 
more difficult. It is impossible to expect defense spending to increase dramatically. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
• What political and economic factors contribute to the continuance of the 
JDIB? 
2. Secondary Questions 
• What are the main characteristics of the JDIB? 
• What are the political and economic factors that enable or inhibit growth 
of the JDIB? 
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• What management strategy should be employed to sustain the JDIB? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope will include an analysis of the relationship between the Japanese 
government and the JDIB as well as an analysis of the impact of political and economic 
factors on continuing to maintain the JDIB. 
First, this thesis examines the status of the JDIB, and then researches which 
factors will contribute to the continuance of the JDIB. This thesis describes the 
characteristics of the JDIB in order to define it. 
The scope will not include an in-depth analysis of Japan’s constitution nor an in-
depth analysis of Japanese politics.  It might, however, be necessary to mention 
constitutional or political issues during these analyses, but this thesis will not focus on the 
details of such issues as they are too complicated to consider. 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for researching this thesis will consist of the following: 
• Conduct a literature search of books, magazine articles, journals, the 
World Wide Web, and other library information resources 
• Conduct a review of existing government and industry organizational 
designs to identify roles and relationships among key defense industry 
stakeholders, e.g. the Japan Defense Agency 
• Evaluate current domestic political and economic policies that impact the 
strategic direction of the defense industry 
• Conduct a review of the past performance of the defense industry to 
identify any recurrent constraints that have precluded/inhibited the 
development of the JDIB 
• Evaluate the impact of identified constraints on the future growth and 
direction of the JDIB 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II outlines the characteristics of Japan’s defense industry and the unique 
industrial environment encompassing the industry. This chapter examines the impact of a 
severely restricted defense export market and the small profit margins associated with 
domestic production. This chapter also discusses the history of the JDIB, structure, and 
the relationship between the JIDB and government agencies.  The focus of this section is 
to highlight some of the difficulties in maintaining the JDIB under current political and 
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economic conditions. Chapter II provides the groundwork for further discussion on the 
continuing evolution of the JDIB and the possible need for industry restructuring to allow 
it to continue. 
Chapter III will describe the environmental changes in Japan since the end of the 
Cold War, and examine the situation currently faced by the Japanese defense industry and 
general trends in the international defense industry. This chapter will examine the 
influence of the U.S. counterparts on the JDIB and examine the affects of "Kokusanka" 
(domestic production) on the overall growth of the Japanese defense industry. This 
chapter will also consider the long-term effects of steady-state defense spending and the 
disincentives this type of spending creates for the JDIB. 
Chapter IV examines the current political posturing holding the Japanese defense 
industry in essentially a "zero-growth" state. This chapter also examines the apparent 
contradiction between the zero-growth policy and a desire to maintain autarky in the 
defense production of defense systems. This chapter also examines present sources of 
defense acquisition including the involvement of international defense firms. An 
examination of the FS-X case is undertaken to explore the consequences of improperly 
structured projects that involve also co-production and international cooperation. This 
chapter concludes with an examination of the management strategies that may facilitate 
the continuance of the JDIB in the 21st century. 
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPANESE DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Japanese defense industry base (JDIB) has been facing rapid changes due to 
the end of the Cold War and prolonged economic difficulties. The Japan Defense Agency 
(JDA) had been able to accept high procurement costs from contractors because its 
expenditures were justified by the rationale that the Self Defense Forces (SDF) must be 
well equipped to protect the country from the threat of the former Soviet Union. In 
addition, continuous Japanese economic growth led to the expansion of defense 
expenditures which also allowed the JDA to buy relatively expensive Japanese made 
weapon systems. 
When the former Soviet Union collapsed, the situation surrounding the JDIB and 
the JDA began to change. This required the JDA to establish new justifications for 
defense expenditures and Tokyo's explanations for the continuing military requirements 
in an uncertain region have been less persuasive and more vague because of uncertainty 
and instability. [Ref. 1] 
The decade long economic slump has also affected defense expenditures. The 
increase in the defense budget was 0.3 percent in FY2001, 0.0 percent in FY00, and -0.2 
percent in FY99. However, real growth, when taking into account price increases and 
other factors, is zero and this trend of almost zero growth in defense spending has been 
occurring since FY94 and is expected to continue into the near future. [Ref. 2] 
This chapter will provide the groundwork for further discussion and will define 
the JDIB, focus on the characteristics, history, and structure of the JDIB and examine the 
relationship between the JDIB and government agencies. Finally, the factors that tend to 





B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JDIB 
1. Three Principles on Arms Export (TPAE) 
The TPAE was established in 1967 with the goal of preventing further 
international conflict. [Ref. 3]  The Japanese government has revised sections of the 
TPAE several times as the international situation changed.  The TPAE, in its current 
form, states that "arms" exports to the following countries or regions is not be permitted:  
• communist bloc countries 
• countries to which the export of arms is prohibited under United Nations 
resolutions 
• countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in 
international conflicts [Ref. 4] 
When discussing the TPAE, it is necessary to understand that these policies 
constrained the activities of companies both implicitly and explicitly. Japanese 
companies do not allow their defense products to be exported because of the TPAE. 
Basically, the TPAE prevents Japan from exporting armaments, and from sharing 
defense technology with any nation other than the United States. [Ref. 5] From the point 
of view of private companies, it might be natural for them to look at overseas markets to 
make profits as they have done for commercial products. However, because of these 
policies, the market for their products is limited to the JDA. 
There is another issue regarding the TPAE that is needs to be discussed. The 
boundaries for technology between military and commercial use has become vague. 
Exporting weapons in and of itself is clearly prohibited, but to define what is a weapon 
and not a weapon at a component level is difficult. For example, a game machine, Sony’s 
Playstation 2, was initially classified as a weapon by the Japanese government and 
subject to export restrictions because the dual 128 bit processor technology, one for the 
instruction code and one for graphics processing, could be used as components in missile 
guidance and other high tech military applications. [Ref. 6] This decision was finally 
rescinded but illustrates how difficult it is to differentiate between what a weapon is and 




2. Less Competition among the JDIB 
The JDIB has produced a wide range of land, sea, and air systems but the number 
of firms capable of meeting the demands of the JDA today is so limited that competition 
over defense contracts is very rare. Listed below are the twelve leading companies 
remaining in terms of defense contracts. 
• Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (ships, military vehicles, aircraft, 
missiles) 
• Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. (ships, aircraft) 
• Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Co., Ltd. (ships, engines) 
• Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (electronics, missiles) 
• Toshiba Corporation (electronics, missiles) 
• NEC Corporation (electronics) 
• Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. (aircraft) 
• The Japan Steel Works, Ltd. (artillery) 
• Komatsu, Ltd. (small arms/ordnance, military vehicles) 
• Hitachi, Ltd. (electronics, military vehicles) 
• Oki Electric Industry Co., Ltd. (electronics) 
• Daikin Industries, Ltd. (small arms/ordnance) 
These twelve companies, including the so-called "heavy" industrial firms and 
several of Japan’s largest electronics manufacturers, account for approximately 95 
percent of the JDA’s acquisition budget. [Ref. 7] The companies that appear on this list 
vary each year, but the top six companies regularly appear on this list. The reason that 
limited numbers of firms are awarded contracts is simply because only those companies 
are able to supply products to the JDA. 
For example, there are three firms capable of producing aircraft on the 
aforementioned list. However, each of them produces different kinds of aircraft. 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has produced a series of fighter aircraft such as the F-
4EJ, F-15J and F-2, for the Air SDF (ASDF), while Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) 
mainly supplies relatively large, multiengine aircraft such as the P-3C, to the Maritime 
SDF (MSDF) and C-1 to the ASDF. Fuji Heavy Industries (FHI) is capable of producing 
small aircraft and it has manufactured aircraft for training. As a result, no competition 
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exists among their products for the JDA. One of these companies usually becomes the 
main contractor and the others support production as subcontractors. As for the recently 
introduced F-2 aircraft, its production follows this same rule. MHI, the main contractor 
and KHI and the FHI, the subcontractors, have been taking part in this project. 
In the case of the construction of combatant ships, there are several companies 
used as contractors such as MHI, KHI, Ishikawajima-Harima (IHI), Mitsui, and Hitachi 
Zosen. However, they have received orders from the JDA based on their production 
capacities and therefore, competition over defense contracts is less likely to occur. 
Moreover, for some specific equipment, only a few companies, and sometimes 
only one, have been awarded contracts from the JDA. The Japan Steel Works, Ltd. is 
typical in this case and this firm is the only one that produces artillery including guns on 
naval combatants. In addition, submarines are constructed by one of two shipyards, and 
only one small arms producer exists in Japan. 
3. Firm’s Low Dependency on the Defense Demands; Major Roles 
Played by Firms 
Within the major companies that contract with the JDA, defense production 
accounts for a relatively small portion of their overall business. The reason is that most of 
Japanese companies’ defense contractors are multifaceted companies which mainly 
produce civilian goods. [Ref. 8] Tables 2.1. and 2.2. show that top ten defense contractors 
in Japan and U.S. 
 










Sales to the 
JDA (in Billion 
Yen) 
1 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) 11.4 2,453.8 279.7 
2 Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. (KHI) 14.0 944.7 132.2 
3 Mitsubishi Electric Corporation 4.1 2,705.0 112.1 
4 Toshiba Corporation 1.5 3,505.3 53.8 
5 Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Co., Ltd. (IHI) 6.7 804.0 53.5 
6 NEC Corporation 1.1 3,784.5 42.6 
7 Komatsu Ltd. 8.4 441.4 37.1 
8 Hitachi Zosen Corp. 9.6 358.5 34.4 
9 Nissan Motor Co., Ltd 0.9 2,997.0 27.3 
10 Japan Electronic Computer Co., Ltd. 8.5 299.7 25.5 
Total 4.4 182,939 7,983 
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Table 2.2. Top 10 Companies in Defense Revenue. [After: Ref. 10] 
Rank Company Revenue from Defense (%) 
2000 Total 
Revenue 
(US million $) 
2000 Defense 
Revenue 
(US million $) 
1 Lockheed Martin Corp. 71.10 25,329.00 18,000.00 
2 Boeing Co. 33.1 51,321.00 17,000.00 
3 Raytheon Co. 83.1 16,895.00 14,033.00 
4 General Dynamics Corp. 63.2 10,356.00 6,542.00 
5 Northrop Grumman Corp. 73.5 7,618.00 5,600.00 
6 United Technologies Corp. 15.5 26.583.00 4,130.00 
7 TRW Inc. 23.3 17,200.00 4,000.00 
8 Honeywell Inc. 12.8 25.000.00 3,200.00 
9 Science Applications International Corp. 39 5,900.00 2,300.00 
10 Newport News Shipbuilding 98 2,070.00 2,028.60 
Total 40.8 188,272.00 76,833.60 
-- Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 15.2 24,118.80 3,672.70 
 
The average defense sales among those top ten companies account for only 4.4% 
of their business while it is approximately 40% for the major defense firms in the United 
States. However, the roles played by those companies are essential to development and 
production because Japan as a state does not possess R & D and production capabilities. 
In other words, the JDA expects the JDIB to be a supplier continuously while the JDIB is 
not relying a great deal on defense sales. 
To cope with the current situation, each company has moved toward restructuring 
including dismissing employees in the defense division and the merger of affiliated 
companies. The merger activity involving more than one company, however, has only 
occurred except for the merger of the shipbuilding sectors of IHI and KHI. Defense 
technology and equipment require special skills not found in civil industries, and 
redeployment is thus an extremely difficult process. It is also extremely difficult for 
technicians to revert to defense-related work after being redeployed to other activities. 
Redeployment can thus lead to the dispersal of technical work forces. [Ref. 11] In order 
to sustain the JDIB it is necessary to maintain a production and a technology base 
simultaneously. 
C. HISTORY OF JDIB 
The history of the JDIB can be divided into three phases.  The first segment is the 
post World War II establishment of the industry.  Next, the industry moved into a 
recovery period in an effort to reestablish capability in defense production.  Finally, the 
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industry sought international cooperation while remaining true to the policy of kokusanka 
whenever possible.  
Before and during World War II, Japan’s industrial base for military production 
had been mainly composed of two kinds of enterprises. One was arsenals run by the 
Imperial Navy and Army, and the others were conglomerates represented by Mitsubishi. 
Such groups had produced a variety of weapons to meet demands during the war. 
After World War II, Japanese industry had to rebuild almost all industrial 
capabilities including the defense industry. Since the occupation authorities had banned 
activities related to armament production, Japan had to wait until 1952 to resume defense 
production, when the United States Forces in Japan needed to repair and maintain their 
equipment to carry out the war on the Korean peninsula. The Korean War (1950-53) 
provided both huge resources to the Japanese economy and a chance for Japan to rearm. 
Note that the time when the Japanese government decided to establish the SDF is 
almost same time when tensions between countries in the Far East Asia had increased due 
to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. That is, Japan's defense 
requirements became motivated primarily by the threat of the Soviet Union's substantial 
force structure in the region. 
As a result, the SDF were established in 1954. At that time, the SDF used 
weapons rented from the United States government and the remnants of the imperial 
forces. The JDA started efforts to arm the SDF with domestic products almost 
simultaneously. As domestic production increased, the portion of the U.S. made or 
designed equipment among the SDF decreased, but this basic composition, the 
coexistence of domestic and U.S. made equipment, still exists by virtue of the U.S.-
Japanese bilateral security relationship.  
It must be noted that armament production was suspended for almost a decade 
from 1945. (Japan resumed producing naval combatant in 1953, and aircraft in 1954.) 
[Ref. 12] The Japanese armament industry could fulfill the military demands at a basic 
level by themselves before the suspension. But what the JDA and managements of 
private companies both recognized larger was how difficult it was to resume production 
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once it began again. This production learning factor still influences the arguments 
supporting the need for maintaining the JDIB as well as the kokusanka. 
Although Japan resumed its defense production, the SDF depended greatly on the 
United States for suppliers and technology transfer. These technology movements across 
the pacific were motivated by the U.S. intention to prevent the spread of communism in 
East Asia. Although these technology transfers were carried out in the form of (free) 
loans, FMS, and licenses, licensed production has provided perfect opportunities for 
Japanese companies to acquire advanced military products and process technologies. For 
example, licensed production of a variety of U.S. military aircraft types has contributed to 
the development of a core of Japanese companies skilled in diverse aspects of aircraft 
production. These programs have also stimulated critical industries such as electronics 
and materials through generous technology transfers. [Ref. 13]  
Under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security, the Japanese government could 
focus on economic development. This government attitude allowed the Japanese 
businesses to concentrate their efforts on producing commercial products. As a result, the 
Japanese economy revived remarkably, and firms became major exporters of commercial 
products by manufacturing high quality products. The important thing is that technologies 
developed for commercial use were applicable to defense products, and made it possible 
to produce quality equipment for the SDF. 
By the 1980s, however, as Japanese companies improved skills and the U.S. 
showed the tendency of protecting sophisticated technologies from flowing out to foreign 
countries, the preference for kokusanka, autonomy in defense production, became evident. 
Since the JDA, originally, has emphasized the importance of a rapid emergency supply, 
and has expressed the fear of vulnerability [Ref. 14] caused by excessive dependency on 
foreign suppliers, the promotion of kokusanka was persuasive argument. Up to this time, 
Japan grew to be a major global economic and financial power, and Japanese companies 
emerged as major exporters of commercial products backed by improved technological 
capabilities. This also positively led to preferring kokusanka.  
The program that sought independent development of a replacement for the aging 
F-1 fighter, known as FS-X, was the most typical example of kokusanka. This program 
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was a way to reduce dependency on the United States for leading-edge military 
technologies and strengthened the country's defense industrial base. [Ref. 15] This 
program finally evolved to co-production by Japan and U.S. firms, and ended, literally, 
the one-way technology transfer that was going on for decades. However, Japan is still 
dependent on several U.S. made technologies. Some of the major equipment, such as 
aircraft, have been produced under licenses from U.S. companies. 
D. STRUCTURE OF JDIB 
The loss of single companies can now remove an entire commodity from the 
JDIB. This is the commonly employed rationale for those who claim it is important to 
maintain the JDIB, as a limited number of companies participate in defense production 
and most are both defense and commercial manufacturers. This also occurs because many 
specialized companies became involved in a major program and collaborate to 
accomplish production.  
Even if this industrial base disappears, the impact on the national economy would 
be slight because defense orders have consistently accounted for only 0.3 to 0.4 percent 
of the total production of Japan. [Ref. 16] The issue at hand is the retention of companies 
that have supplied weapons to the JDA and skilled labor. 
Japan’s defense budget in 2000 was around US $45.5 billion. [Ref. 17] However, 
the procurement budget is only about 18%. [Ref. 2] Japan’s defense spending is unlikely 
to increase in the near future because Japan has limited its defense budget to one percent 
of the GDP, and because of the economic slump that has been going on for more than ten 
years. 
The JDIB is composed of both the leading companies and numerous small and 
medium sized associated companies. It also includes suppliers of food, garments and 
medical supplies. In the case of major equipment procurement, there are some contractors 
and many subcontractors; it has been stated that the number of companies participating 
programs exceeds 1,000, with about 70-80% being medium and small-sized businesses. 
For example, 1,140 firms were involved in the production of the F-15J. 
However, only a few firms can play “key” roles in defense contracts. Only a small 
number of companies are capable of producing aircraft, naval combatant ships, tanks, and 
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artillery. As shown in Table 2.1, MHI, the top contractor, defense sales make up about 
11% of it total sales. For other major companies participating in defense contracts, this 
figure is much lower and is estimated on average to be 4.4% of total production.  
These companies often maintain cooperative relationships within the industry by 
virtue of their particular specialties. For example, in the aerospace industry, which 
consists of MHI, KHI, IHI, and FHI, all except FHI are able to produce aircraft engines. 
But, IHI is usually the main contractor when doing business with the JDA. As for the 
airframe industry, all firms except IHI supply the JDA with aircraft, but only MHI has 
been the main contractor for fighter aircraft, KHI for multi-engine, large aircraft such as 
the P-3C, and FHI for small training planes. Even though one company wins any 
contract, production is carried out in a collaborative manner. In the F-2 program, MHI is 
in charge of the front part of the fuselages and right wings, as well as the final assembly; 
KHI produces the center fuselages and engine access doors; and FHI supplies the tail 
assemblies; radar domes and air-intakes.  
Defense contractors are integrated with the commercial sector at the individual 
company level and are also integrated with other firms.  This integration suggests that it 
is a crucial sustaining element of the JDIB. This also suggests this it is difficult to keep 
companies as potential contractors. Except for ammunition and aircraft producers, which 
have no other customers and depend on JDA demands almost 100 percent and 62.7 
percent respectively (1997) [Ref. 18], it is hard to assume that current contractors will 
maintain their defense production capabilities without any incentive. 
E. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE JDIB AND GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES 
1. Japan Defense Agency (JDA) 
The JDA, established to defend the country, is recognized as an administrative 
organization in charge of the three services of SDF (Ground/Maritime/Air SDF), while 
the SDF is an arms organization. The JDA, unlike the U.S. DoD, is not a full-fledged 
ministry. It is an agency that reports to the Cabinet Office. The SDF is literally the 
JDIB’s only customer. The JDA has a policy of placing importance on domestic 
development and production, or the so-called kokusanka because the JDA is seriously 
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fearful of the potential vulnerability of relying on foreign suppliers. Thus, the JDA’s 
procurement considerations include: 
• Suitability to the plan of operations 
• Ease of improvement, upgrade, maintenance and supply 
• Maintaining and securing production and technological bases 
• Technological risks 
• Cost effectiveness 
• Effects on employment and income [Ref. 3] 
There is the commonly accepted idea among Japanese that a country’s defense 
capability is based on that country’s own industrial power and primarily its 
manufacturing capacity. Consequently, the existence of a sound defense industry is 
thought to be major precondition for securing an adequate defense capability. [Ref. 2] 
This idea also drives a movement for promoting the domestic production of weapons.  
Since the JDA does not have any state-owned arsenals since being established, all 
production of a trial product in defense technical study development is consigned to a 
commercial R & D base. To incorporate existing or developing technologies, JDA makes 
the most of its attached institute called the Technical Research and Development Institute 
(TRDI). TRDI is the sole organization of the JDA that conducts defense related RDT & 
E, but the budget allocated to R & D is limited to approximately three percent of the total 
defense budget. Therefore, it is difficult to expect TRDI to conduct all required studies. 
Consequently, TRDI’s strategy is to stretch its relatively modest resources by cultivating 
promising technologies already under development in the private sector. [Ref. 13] Thus, 
the activities in TRDI are primarily test and evaluation of existing technologies rather 
than R & D in the usual sense.  
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The procurement decision-making process in the JDA does not seem to reflect the 
SDF’s opinions directly, but rather, one affected by external factors. Officials from other 
ministries often are in charge of the internal bureaus, which is a major component of the 
JDA. For example, the Bureau of Finance, which develops the Defense Agency budget 
and establishes spending priorities for the Defense Agency and the SDF, is likely to be 
headed by officials from the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Officials from the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) are frequently assigned to the Bureau of 
Equipment. In the context of this thesis, the relationship between METI and JDA is 
important in understanding the JDIB. 
2. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
There are also some other government offices that influence defense production. 
One important player is the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, formerly 
known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry -MITI). METI, which has 
responsibility for securing and promoting national wealth, and play the key role in the 
development of policies on industry and international trade. As a result, it maintains 
strong connections with the industrial world, and is likely to focus on the sustainment and 
growth of domestic industries as a whole. 
The MITI used to administer the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, 
(AIST) and promoted advanced technology development. As a result of the 
reorganization of the central government enforced at the beginning of 2001, though, 
AIST became an independent organization. It still oversees 15 laboratories and serves as 
the base of technological innovations, as well as for their numerous original research 
projects. Those laboratories have supported the R & D in advanced technologies, that are 
hardly ever done by private companies, but which contribute to the development of 
superior technologies employed in commercial products. Technology usually moves from 
commercial to defense products-the so-called “spin-on”. The role played by these METI 
related institutes is not negligible in prompting these technical development processes. 
The METI has affected the JDIB in another aspect. In Japan, due to the Law for 
Enterprises Manufacturing Aircraft and the Law for Manufacturing Weapons and 
Munitions, companies engaging in activities articulated under the aforementioned laws 
must obtain permission from METI and provide details such as location, ownership, type 
of technologies used, and capitalization. METI’s Aircraft and Defense Products and 
Space Industry Division exercises oversight of the production of all aircraft and parts, as 
well as munitions and weapons. These two laws remain the primary legislative 
concerning defense procurement in Japan. [Ref. 14] 
The METI also controls arms exports based on the Foreign Exchange and Foreign 
Trade Law. In the case of exported arms or equipment to be used in military actions, the 
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law requires export licenses to all destinations. In addition, "arms" trades mediated 
between foreign countries by a Japanese agent require the permission of the METI. [Ref. 
4] 
3. Evaluation of JDIB by the Government Agencies 
Both the JDA and the METI organized a meeting for the study of defense 
industrial and technology bases. In its report published in November 2000, this meeting 
emphasized the following aspects that the JDIB should maintain: 
• Technologies and production capabilities that make it possible to provide 
equipment such as MBT, combatants, aircrafts, and missiles fitting the 
characteristics of national land and condition 
• Technologies and production capabilities that make it possible to provide 
equipment, for example, cipher codes, which cause difficulties in terms of 
security if imported 
• Maintenance, repair, and supply capabilities that assure existing defense 
abilities are fully performed 
• Urgent supply capabilities in case of emergency 
• Technologies difficult to obtain from importing due to security issues 
• Bargaining power  
• Deterrence as a potential defense capacity caused by holding flexible 
production capabilities [Ref. 19] 
This report also mentions “spin-off”, or technology flow from defense to 
commercial fields, and “spin-on”, and claims that by virtue of dynamic technology 
circulation between defense and commercial fields, defense technology contributes 
significantly to the advancement of the technology level of Japanese companies. This 
evaluation of the JDIB is common in the government offices concerned, and leads to the 
rationale that stresses the importance of keeping the JDIB.  
4. JDIB and Government Offices 
Although the JDA and the METI understand the JDIB as an area to be protected, 
actual practices appear different, because not only has the portion of sales from defense 
market been very low but also the R & D expenditures have been covered by the 
commercial sector itself. As for R & D expenditures, in 1999, the central government and 
public organization invested 326 billion yen which was only merely 9.3 percent of the 
total R & D expenditures in activities conducted by the private entities, while companies 
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injected 10.8 trillion yen -- 87.0 percent of the R & D expenditures. [Ref. 20] Since these 
figures include all R & D activities, it is obvious that the amount allocated to the JDIB is 
very limited. 
However, the R & D expenditures of defense companies seem eventually to be 
recouped by production contracts. In 2001, 78.9 percent of procurement contracts, on a 
monetary base, are awarded on a discretionary basis or without competition, and 12.7 
percent are given through limited competition. [Ref. 21] In general, the prices or bids are 
supposed to be determined by the market price. However, it is difficult for products made 
specifically for the JDA to be compared with the prices of others in the commercial 
market. In that case then, it is understood that the contracts have a profit margin of about 
10 percent, and costs are calculated on a cost plus basis.  
Consequently, Japanese business leaders did not view the JDA as simply another 
market. Rather, the defense budget was considered a means of raising the general level of 
technological expertise of Japanese business. [Ref. 14] For the JDIB, the government 
offices concerned are those that have provided the opportunities for both R & D, 
production, and test and evaluation of their products while the JDIB, especially for the 
JDA, has been a source that supplied the required equipment consistently. Thus, it is 
possible to state that there is a mutually beneficial relationship. 
F. FACTORS THAT INHIBIT GROWTH OF THE JDIB 
It can be said that Article 9 of Japan’s constitution is the basic factors instructing 
the size of the JDIB. It says that  
aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In 
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. [Ref. 22]  
This “no-war” clause not only keeps Japanese companies from exporting defense 
products, but also creates and legitimizes pacifist sentiments among the Japanese people. 
Moreover, the JDA must purchase defense systems from the defense-oriented 
infrastructure. In other words, buying existing “off-the-shelf” items involves difficulties 
for the JDA. Although the JDA has introduced a variety of weapons, some of them were 
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modified so as not to violate the spirit of the Constitution. For example, F-4EJs for the 
ASDF do not have some attack systems and inflight refueling capabilities because such 
equipment is incompatible with the “self defense” philosophy. 
1. Three Principles on Arms Export (TPAE) as Constraints 
TPAE is accepted as a policy that the Government of Japan shall not promote 
"arms" exports, regardless of the destinations. In February 1976, the Japanese 
government announced the collateral policy guideline at the Diet session that "arms" 
exports to other areas not included in TPAE will be also restrained to conform with 
Japan's position as a peace-loving nation. [Ref. 4] Arms and equipment for arms 
production subjected to TPAE are listed on the Export Trade Control Order: 
(1) Firearms and cartridges to be used therefore (including those to be 
used for emitting light or smoke), and accessories thereof (excluding rifle-
scopes), as well as parts thereof. 
(2) Ammunition (excluding cartridges), and equipment for its dropping or 
launching, and accessories thereof, as well as parts thereof. 
(3) Explosives (excluding ammunition) and military fuel. 
(4) Explosive stabilizers. 
(5) Directed energy weapons and parts thereof. 
(6) Kinetic energy weapons (excluding firearms) and equipment for their 
launching, as well as parts thereof. 
(7) Military vehicles, and accessories thereof, and bridges for military use, 
as well as parts thereof. 
(8) Military vessels, and hulls and accessories thereof, as well as parts 
thereof. 
(9) Military aircraft and accessories thereof, as well as parts thereof. 
(10) Anti-submarine nets and anti-torpedo nets as well as buoyant electric 
cable for sweeping magnetic mines. 
(11) Armor plates, military helmets, and bullet-proof jackets, as well as 
parts thereof. 
(12) Military searchlights and control equipment thereof. 
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(13) Bacterial, chemical and radio-active agents for military use, as well as 
equipment and parts thereof for dissemination, protection, detection, or 
identification thereof. 
(14) Biopolymers for detection and identification of chemical agents for 
military use and cultures of cells for production thereof, as well as 
biocatalysts for decontamination and degradation of chemical agents for 
military use and expression vectors, viruses or cultures of cells containing 
the genetic information necessary for production thereof. 
(15) Equipment and parts thereof for the production or testing of military 
explosives. 
(16) Equipment for the production or testing of arms, as well as parts and 
accessories thereof. [Ref. 23]  
The METI controls Japan's arms exports based on the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Law. Those who intend to export arms and equipment for listed arms 
production require export licenses to all destinations. In addition, arms trades mediated 
between foreign countries by a Japanese agent need the permission of the METI. [Ref. 4] 
However, these principles do not completely prohibit exporting arms to foreign 
countries. In 1983, the Japanese Cabinet approved the comprehensive position of the 
Japanese Government regarding the issue of transfers of “military technologies.” As a 
result, the transfer of military technologies to the United States is not subject to TPAE. It 
is important to note that neither Japanese laws nor TPAE prohibit exports of weapons or 
weapons technologies to the United States. 
The most significant impact caused by TPAE on JDIB is that the market would be 
limited only to JDA. Technically, the Japanese government has allowed companies to 
export defense products, but it is unlikely there is a need for Japanese made weapons in 
the United States. Generally, lack of export market, emphasis on indigenous production 
creates higher prices for JDA’s acquisition efforts. Since the Japanese government makes 
the JDA possess the minimum necessary defense capability, and removes the 
opportunities of exporting arms from private firms, arms production is done in small 
batches, though wide ranging. To make matters worse, in Japan's defense procurement 
system, contracts are awarded annually to continue or expand work on ongoing projects. 
The amount of equipment purchased each year is relatively small. For example, in 
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FY2000, 18 type-90 tanks, three UH-60JAs, one 4,600 ton class Destroyer, and nine F-2s 
were ordered. As a result, there are no economies of scale, for suppliers, thereby 
increasing costs. 
Given the current budget trends, the domestic market will not expand in the near 
future, and will probably shrink since JDA will not bear the increasing procurement costs 
for weapons made in Japan. This also deprives them of opportunities for R & D, 
production, and test and evaluation. Originally, major Japanese contractors had highly 
integrated their commercial and defense sectors and did not usually depend on defense 
sales. To cope with declining opportunities in the defense sector, it is likely that private 
firms will shift their resources from defense to commercial sectors, which is considered a 
loss of JDIB. 
2. Pacifist Sentiment 
Many Japanese believe in peace, regard wars as absolutely evil, and refuse any 
idea or item related to wars. This strong pacifist sentiment emerged from Japan's World 
War II defeat. This emotion is based on regret for experiences during the war and tends to 
restrict military activities. Consequently, the Constitution prohibits the SDF having 
offensive equipment, such as the bombing capability for fighter aircraft. Moreover, 
companies that supply various weapons to JDA are very sensitive to the “negative” image 
of defense business. Military affairs remind the Japanese of the negative images of 
Japanese conduct during World War II. 
Japanese businesses tend not to openly mention that they are involved in the 
defense business. When looking at the web sites of major contractors, it is rare to see 
words or pictures relating to defense equipment. This may not only be because their 
defense sales account for a tiny part of their business, but also revealing JDA business 
may harm the image of a company. 
This implies that Japanese companies may hesitate to export their products and 
technologies to foreign countries, even if not banned. They would also be concerned that 
their technologies used in products would appear in third countries via the United States, 
which is excluded from TPAE. For companies, the advantages or benefits of exporting 
their equipment rarely exceed the disadvantages. Those disadvantages include penalties 
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under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law and harsh attention from the mass 
media.  
Japan's mass media usually has completely supported peace and encouraged anti-
military feelings. For example, the media, when discussing U.S. military bases in Japan, 
and especially those in Okinawa, has taken a consistently negative position. All things 
related to military or defense issues, including arms and arms exports, are not excepted.  
It is easily expected that once a TPAE violation is revealed, the firm may have to face 
intense mass media campaigns. This would result in jeopardizing their commercial sales. 
Arms exports may help spread costs over large production runs. However, this 
choice is still too risky, even though the serious attention paid to defense or military 
issues had relaxed as time passes. In the future, because of the increasing sophistication 
of weapons and the importance of commercial technologies in weapons, the expectations 
for Japanese companies to provide such technologies may also increase. In that case, this 
pacifist sentiment would be the strongest deterrent to the production of defense items by 
Japanese firms. 
G. SUMMARY 
The JDIB has increasingly been a source of defense equipment for the SDF. As a 
result, the activities of the JDIB have been directed by political rather than economic 
factors. The Japanese government (JDA) has procured equipment primarily from the 
JDIB while prohibiting the export of defense related products. To meet all the 
requirements of the JDA, Japanese companies have become specialists in their areas in 
the industry, and the development and production of weapons systems for the SDF have 
been conducted based on a cooperative relationship within the JDIB. 
Some major companies are usually awarded defense contracts. Reflecting the 
specialization of each company, it is difficult to observe competition in the JDA’s 
procurement processes. Major defense contractors are usually leading companies in 
commercial products, and defense production accounts for a relatively small portion of 
their overall businesses. Since the Japanese government is not capable of developing and 
producing defense equipment, the roles played by these major companies are essential in 
fulfilling the government’s preference for indigenous products. 
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After World War II, the Japanese government endeavored to develop a small 
domestic defense industry. To obtain the required technologies, the Japanese government 
takes advantage of production under licenses from U.S. companies. These technological 
transfers from the U.S. have facilitated not only arming the SDF but also accumulating 
and improving the technological expertise of Japanese companies. To the JDIB, defense 
contracts are more than just a business. The defense budget was considered a means of 
promoting their technology level. Thus, the Japanese government has been able to 
provide incentives to Japanese companies to do business with the defense sector. 
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE JDIB 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The JDIB has been facing challenges, resulting from budget constraints, and 
resulting from efforts to reduce the budget deficit during decade-long economic slump. 
Consequently, orders from the JDA have continued to decrease, and the JDIB no longer 
has the opportunity to engage in the defense production that has contributed to the 
improvement of both commercial and defense technologies. 
Kokusanka, or domestic production, has been the most influential strategy in 
allowing the JDIB to learn new production processes. This is by no means limited to the 
defense industry. Rather, this seems to be the standard strategy in promoting 
industrialization. The Japanese government historically emphasizes the importance of 
technology, and has promoted indigenous production in entire industries. For example, it 
has been stated that Japan would be able to produce almost any kind of industrial 
products within approximately 20 years after opening the country to foreign trade in 1868. 
Now, however, this kokusanka strategy seems to be at a crossroads. 
Since the Japanese government banned the export of defense products abroad to 
all but the United States, and the unit costs of equipment are likely to be stabilized at a 
high level, the purchasing power of the JDA is accordingly less deflated. Although the 
JDA appears to still maintain the kokusanka strategy by asking the JDIB to cut costs, it 
will be difficult to maintain domestic production capabilities. 
There is some new movement in the JDIB, though it can hardly be called dynamic. 
In addition to the cost reduction efforts of individual companies through restructuring, 
some companies became involved mergers of defense production divisions. Moreover, 
some companies started to collaborate with U.S. companies in order to reduce costs 
associated with R & D.  It seems difficult for Japanese companies to amalgamate with 
foreign companies due to Japanese legislation. However, international collaboration is 
likely to be a trend in the JDIB. 
This chapter will describe the environmental change in Japan pursuant to the end 
of the Cold War, and examine the current situation faced by the Japanese defense 
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industry. This chapter also examines the affects of kokusanka, or domestic production, on 
the overall growth of the Japanese defense industry. 
B. EVOLUTIONARY ENVIRONMENT OF THE JDIB 
1. Changing Needs for the SDF and the New Mid-Term Defense 
Program 
Since the end of the Cold War, the environment for Japan and the JDA has 
changed drastically. Namely, the Soviet Union is gone and the SDF, created to protect the 
country from this threat, still remains. Thus, the primary rationale for the SDF has 
disappeared and the Japanese government is faced with having to justify it existence. 
After the Cold War, ironically, the Japanese have experienced a state of unrest. 
The Japanese have had territorial disputes over the Takesima Islands with South Korea 
and the Senkaku Islands with China, and experienced tensions over both islands in the 
mid-1990s. The relationship between China and Taiwan is also a Japanese security 
concerns. Moreover, not only has North Korea launched missiles toward Japan, but also, 
its ambitions to have nuclear weapons have been a serious concern for Japan. The JDA 
and SDF are expected to cope with these new kinds of missions as well as those regional 
stability issues. Also, Japan has experienced number of natural disasters such as the Kobe 
earthquake, subway gas attacks by a radical cult [Ref. 24] and interception of suspicious 
boats [Ref. 25] during the 1990s. No other organization could deal with these situations. 
Strictly speaking, the JDA also could not carry out such unforeseen events effectively, 
and but attracted considerable attention because of its ineptitude. 
The new Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP, FY2001-2005) mentioned the 
significance of improving capabilities to cope with a wide variety of attacks, and also to 
upgrade and enhance disaster relief. The MTDP also mentions that measures to establish 
a highly reliable networking environment, various command, control and communication 
systems and information security throughout the SDF will be given priority and promoted 
through the active use of information technology to keep up with much intense and 
speedier warfare, higher-performance weapons and electronic attacks (cyber attacks) 
against an information system. All of these are possible because of the rapid evolution 
and diffusion of information technology. [Ref. 26] However, this MTDP appears to 
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allocate resources inappropriately based on a concept generated during the Cold War era, 
and will not result in a drastic transformation of the SDF. 
Total outlay for this five-year program is approximately estimated at 25.16 trillion 
yen. The new program includes two 13,500-ton destroyers (DDH) with a flat deck for 
helicopter operations, four aerial refueling tankers, and development programs for 
maritime patrol (PX) and transport aircraft (CX). The modernization of the IT systems is 
also included in this program. Major equipment to be acquired during the MTDP is 
shown in the following table. 
 
Table 3.1. Major Programs, Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP), JFY 2001-05. [From: 
Ref. 27] 
Area System/Program Units; Five-Year Costs 
Type 90 MBT 91 units; ¥73 billion 
MLRS 18 units; ¥40 billion 
Armored vehicle 129 units; ¥20 billion 
Transport helicopter CH-47JA 7 units; ¥30 billion 
HAWK improvement kit 0.25 groups; ¥20 billion 
Ground defense 
capabilities 
New medium-ranged SAM 1.25 groups; ¥80 billion 
Destroyer 5; ¥540 billion 
Guided missile destroyer DDG with latest 
Aegis system 
2 units; ¥80 billion 
Helicopter destroyer DDH 2; ¥200 billion 
Submarines 5; ¥260 billion 
Anti-submarine helicopter SH-60J 39 units; ¥240 billion 
Maritime defense 
capabilities 
Airborne mine countermeasures helicopter 
MH-53E 
2 units; ¥10 billion 
F-15 modernization 12 units; ¥30 billion 
F-2 support fighter 47 units; ¥490 million 
Transport helicopter CH-47J 12 units; ¥50 billion 
Tanker transport 4 units; ¥90 billion 
Air defense 
capabilities 
BADGE system modernization ¥25 billion 
Defense information infrastructure (tri-service 
computer integration program) 
¥25 billion IT network 
Common operating environment ¥5 billion 
Fixed-wing maritime patrol/ASW P-3C and 
C-1 transport replacements 
¥340 billion 
New main battle tank ¥50 billion 
Research and 
development 






2. Budget Trend 
In the near future, it will be difficult for Japan’s defense expenditures to increase 
for two reasons. One is ongoing fiscal reform, and the other is the psychological ceiling 
tied to strong pacifist sentiments. 
Before entering the current decade-long economic slump, the Japanese economy 
achieved superb growth. The average real GDP growth rate reached 5% in the 1970s, and 
4% in the 1980s. In the early 1990s, the Japanese economy entered a recession. Although 
the economy seemed to improve from 1993 to 1996, the Japanese economy once again 
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Figure 3.1. Nominal GDP and Real Growth Rate. [After: Ref. 28] 
 
The Japanese government has taken several measures to help the economy 
recover from the recession. To promote fiscal efficiency and qualitative improvement, 
since the Ministry of Finance (MOF) claims that all expenses have been thoroughly 
examined and coordinated without exception, every expenditure, therefore, is likely to be 
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Figure 3.2. Defense Budget and Growth Rate. [After: Ref. 2] 
 
Although the defense budget had grown smoothly with Japan’s remarkable 
economic development, as shown in Figure 3.2, defense expenditures have almost 
flattened since 1997. This is mainly because the Japanese economy remains stagnant. A 
ceiling, which reflects the Japanese government’s policy by not threatening neighboring 
countries, also contributes, to some extent, to this trend. The Japanese government had 
placed a ceiling of 1% of the gross national product on defense expenditures since 1976. 
This ceiling was discontinued in 1987 but the amount of defense expenditures in the GDP 














Figure 3.3. Ratio of Expenditures to the GDP. [After: Ref. 29] 
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Although the Japanese government does not have a definite limit on defense 
spending, it is unlikely to drastically increase defense spending due to both domestic and 
international feelings toward the SDF. 
In addition to a “zero-growth” defense budget, expenditures for front-line 
equipment are decreasing. Dividing defense expenditures into two categories, logistics 
and front-line equipment, a trend can be seen. The portion of expenditures for front-line 
equipment in total has decreased since 1992. Front-line equipment includes aircrafts, 
ships, tanks, artilleries, missiles, and ammunition. Logistics is R & D, equipment repair, 



















Figure 3.4. Expenditures from Front-Line and Logistics. [After: Ref. 29] 
 
3. Procurement Reform 
The JDA has continued its efforts to cut its costs associated with defense 
equipment to adopt a declining budget and a rise in unit prices due to the sophistication of 
weapons. The JDA recognizes that in the current situation, it is essential to reduce 
equipment costs in order to maintain the required level of defense capability. Therefore, 
the JDA has implemented procurement reform by focusing on its procurement systems 
and organization. This reform included: 
• Review of the Defense Agency's standards and specifications 
• Promotion of R&D that is useful to reduce life-cycle costs  
• Structuring of an efficient defense production framework  
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• Improvement of the procurement system and its implementation  
• Reduction of maintenance and repair costs through such measures as an 
improvement in efficiency in various systems 
• Promotion of CALS (Continuous Acquisition and Life-cycle Support)  
As a measure to reduce procurement costs, the JDA required suppliers to reduce 
production costs by 10% in three years starting in 1999 while introducing a "cost 
reduction incentive system." This incentive system offered 50% of the actual cost 
reduction after examining the contractors’ proposal for reducing costs for materials and 
engineering methods. To enhance cost reductions through this incentive system, the JDA 
is planning on relaxing conditions. To ensure transparency and fairness in the 
procurement of equipment and services, and to establish efficient procurement and supply 
systems, the JDA claimed that it would promote procurement and acquisition reforms 
such as strengthening market principles. [Ref. 2] 
C. INFLUENCE OF "KOKUSANKA" 
Kokusanka has been effectively nurtured by the JDIB. This strategy also protected 
the JDIB from international competition in the defense sector. Traditionally, the JDA has 
considered that the recovery of the lost defense production base would take a long time 
and a lot of effort because of the specialized technology accumulated through the 
experience and facilities required. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly important to 
maintain and secure defense production and technological bases within the country. In 
addition, since the Constitution includes a no war clause, it has been difficult to field 
“off-the-shelf” equipment from foreign countries. 
This strategy causes at least two problems. One is the high cost of production, and 
another is the quality of the equipment. Due to kokusanka, only Japanese companies are 
allowed to become suppliers in many cases. Japanese companies are not permitted to 
export defense products and are not able to realize economies of scale. Moreover, since 





 Table 3.2. Unit Price Comparison. [After: Refs. 21, 30, 31, and 32] 
Item Quantity
Total Cost
(Mil. Yen)  Unit Cost (Yen)
Value in US $
($1=125 Yen)
Type 89




174 477 2,741,379          21,931            4,087 M249 SAW
Submachine gun
(9mm cal.) 100 30 300,000             2,400              894
MP-5N
(cal. 9mm)
Tank (Type-90) 18 13,600 755,555,556       6,044,444        3,100,000 M-1
MLRS(M270) 9 13,200 1,466,666,667    11,733,333      9,600,000 MLRS
UH-60JA 3 7,900 2,633,333,333    21,066,667      8,000,000 UH-60
F-2 9 87,000 9,666,666,667    77,333,333      19,000,000 F-16
F-15 0 12,000,000,000  96,000,000      33,000,000 F-15




Table 3.2 shows the comparison of unit costs purchased by the JDA in 2000 and 
the unit costs of the U.S. counterpart. This table definitely indicates that the purchasing 
power of the JDA is deflated by the kokusanka strategy. Although the JDA’s equipment 
is not necessarily identical to the U.S. counterpart, it is possible to reduce procurement 
costs if the JDA renounces kokusanka and compromises on specific capabilities. 
There is always skepticism about Japanese made weapons’ quality, since Japan is 
not engaged in combat now. Besides weapons produced under licenses, weapons are 
designed and produced based on limited operational knowledge. An example follows 
regarding the performance of indigenous equipment. When minesweepers were 
dispatched to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War, the equipment did not work well. The 
actual experiences of Japanese minesweepers rested exclusively with Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) activities. They usually disposed of sea-mines that were 
scattered by Allied forces during World War II. Since the missions were only carried out 
in Japan’s coastal waters, they did not know about problems with their equipment. 
However, as they encountered a new environment and a new threat, the minesweepers 
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revealed the need for more capable equipment. This implies that it is difficult to consider 
all anticipated situations without experiencing them, and therefore, weapons made in 
Japan may be of inferior quality compared to similar items produced by other countries. 
Those issues in terms of high cost and quality are from a user’s viewpoint. Given 
affordability or cost performance under a shrinking budget, kokusanka does have 
negative aspects. However, examining this matter from a producer’s point of view reveals 
favorable aspects. First, kokusanka allows producers to accumulate technologies. This is 
very clear in the aerospace industry. 
Major companies in the aerospace industry, such as MHI, KHI, and FHI, have 
been subcontracted for foreign commercial aircraft companies such as Boeing and Airbus. 
This subcontracting proves that these Japanese firms have relevant technologies, at least 
in part, to produce world-class aircraft. This is attributed mostly to the kokusanka strategy. 
These companies have never experienced major commercial aircraft development, except 
for the YS-11s, which were designed and produced by the Nihon Airplane Manufacturing 
Corporation (NAMCO). Therefore a special entity was created by MITI to develop the 
YS-11. [Ref. 33] The YS-11 was produced from 1964 to 1972. This is the only project 
that offered Japanese companies a chance to develop and produce commercial aircraft.  
In contrast to other fields in the defense industry, the aerospace industry greatly 
depends on the demands from the JDA. In another words, they have accumulated 














Figure 3.5. Aerospace’s Dependency on JDA. [After: Ref. 30] 
While dependency has declined recently, more than half of its production is still 
for the JDA. Moreover, since the production of the F-2 has initiated a development 
program for the PX and CX, this dependency may increase in the future. 
To achieve autonomy, Japan has made the most of licensed production. The 
Japanese recognized licensed production as a means to obtaining the desired technologies 
for aircraft production, and expected the technologies to diffuse throughout the economy. 
The Japanese also consider licensed production to be a form of kokusanka. 
 




Program Licensor Units 
1955 F-86F North American 300 
1956 P2V-7 Lockheed 48 
1961 F-104J Lockheed 230 
1969 F-4EJ McDonnell Douglass 140 
1972 HU-1H McDonnell Douglass 133 
F-15J/DJ McDonnell Douglass 194 1981 P-3C Lockheed 105 
1983 AH-1S Bell 89 
1984 CH-47 Boeing 61 
1988 SH/UH-60J Sikorsky 132 
1994 UH-1J Bell 76 
 
Table 3.3 shows major licensed production programs. The very first program was 
the production of the Bell 47 and began in 1953. Many of the programs were designed for 
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defense production. Thanks to those programs, Japanese companies have made steady 
progress in technologies even though the domestic market for the industry remains small 
scale and there was almost no chance to develop aircraft. They have been involved in 
several international co-production projects since the 1980s, and they are highly regarded 
in terms of the quality of their product by contractors. 
The example of kokusanka in the aerospace industry, has provided opportunities 
for Japanese companies to learn “know-how” by producing U.S. designed advanced 
equipment. Consequently, this strategy contributes to the improvement and enhancement 
of their level of technology, and strengthens industrial competitiveness. 
 
D. IMPACT OF DEFENSE BUDGET EXPENDITURES ON JDIB 
To deal with declining budgets, the JDA revised resource allocations and 
postponed the start of some programs. The JDA’s efforts also include considerations 
whether commercial products could be substituted for defense equipment, and also 
reducing orders for new equipment. Table 3.4 shows that the volume of procurement has 
declined since the 1990s. On the other hand, companies are countering this by 
rationalizing management practices and improving efficiency in ways such as personnel 
reassignment and a reduction of capital investment. [Ref. 3]  
There is another challenge facing contractors. Although each MTDP project has a 
scale of procurement in the course of the program, the plan is subject to review if 
necessary after three years within the total amount of funding set forth in this plan, taking 
into account the international situation, technological trends, economic and fiscal 
conditions and other factors in and outside Japan at the time. [Ref. 26] Consequently, the 
projected number of systems procured is likely to be reduced. This makes it impossible 
for companies to set up stable production plans and difficult to allocate resources 
appropriately. 
Business in the JDA used to be beneficial to companies. A business leader said, 
"We have to go value-added, and all that is left is space and defense." These companies 
envision commercial spin-offs from defense production, and they fear that they may miss 
out on new developments if they are not at least peripherally involved in the defense 
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business. They believe defense will drive innovations in areas such as electronic 
components. [Ref. 34] This comment describes well how Japanese companies looked at 
defense projects. Previously, as the Japanese economy continuously grew, defense 
expenditures, (which was limited to 1% of GDP) also kept expanding.  
Now, however, while companies still maintain an interest in “spin-offs” from 
defense technologies, some defense industry businesses that staying in the defense 
business is impossible under the existing system, and some are contemplating the 
possibility of completely withdrawing from the defense sector. [Ref. 18] 
 
Table 3.4. Mid Term Defense System. [After: Ref. 29] 
Mid Term Defense Program (MTDP) 
FY91-95 FY96-00 FY01-05 Services System 
Initial Adjusted Initial Adjusted Initial 
MBT 132 108 96 90 91 
MLRS 36 36 45 45 18 
Armored Vehicle 218 193 168 157 129 




Transport Helicopter 14 12 12 9 7 
Destroyer 10 8 8 7 5 
Submarine 5 5 5 5 5 





Helicopter 36 31 37 37 39 
Fighter Aircraft 42 29 51 49 47 
Transport Aircraft 3 1 -- -- -- 




Trainer Aircraft 90 68 59 54 -- 
















In addition to shrinking orders, the JDA’s consideration for acquiring commercial 
substitutes may make defense business less attractive. This lessens expectations of 
companies can improve their technical expertise through defense system development.  
What Japanese companies have done so far is mainly internal restructuring such 
as a retrenchment of defense divisions and an amalgamation of affiliated companies but 
movements toward consolidation are rare. As for mergers, two of the shipbuilders’, IHI 
and Sumitomo Heavy Industry marketing and design sectors, were merged into Marine 
United Inc. in 1995. IHI also took over the defense and aerospace division of Nissan 
Motor Co. Ltd. in 2000. Nissan has been carrying out its restructuring plan to achieve 
growth, improve profitability, and reduce debt. Nissan sold its defense division so that it 
can concentrate its resources in other areas. Japanese companies are usually less 
dependent on defense business, so reducing orders from the JDA does not, to a great 
extent, affect their business. However, they are also suffering from money-losing 
businesses affecting their prime businesses due to Japan’s prolonged economic slump. 
Nissan’s case proves that withdrawing from the defense sector is one of the options when 
companies mull over reinforcing their core business. 
On the other hand, the current situation creates an incentive to cooperate with U.S. 
companies as a means of improving their competitiveness and technological capabilities. 
Japanese businesses have been interested in cooperation with the United States through 
programs employing cutting-edge technologies such as TMD. [Ref. 11] Recently, the 
Mitsubishi Electric Co. (MELCO) allegedly announced a partnership with Lockheed 
Martin. [Ref. 35] They will develop missiles, radar and other defense equipment and 
share technologies. Since companies involved in a partnership can expect not only an 
improvement in the level of technology but also a reduction in costs associated with R & 
D, this movement toward partnerships will increase. 
E. SUMMARY 
The SDF’s mission has been changing since the end of the Cold War. New 
missions are planned to cope with attacks waged in various forms including an event such 
as the subway gas attack and cyber attacks, and upgrade and enhance disaster relief 
capability. As a result, the JDA is required to have new equipment to accomplish new 
missions while maintaining the weapons systems currently in use. 
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However, the defense budgets remain stable. In addition to this “zero-growth” 
trend, expenditures for front-line equipment have been slowly decreasing. On the other 
hand, since kokusanka is an expensive approach to weapons development, the purchasing 
power of the JDA is deflated by this strategy. In order to address this situation, the JDA 
has made efforts to reduce procurement costs by requiring suppliers to cut production 
costs and reducing the volume of procurement. 
The JDA is practically the JDIB’s smallest and only defense buyer. Thus, the flat 
defense budget directly influences the JDIB. Japanese companies are curtailing the 
defense division, and merging affiliated companies in order to adjust to decreasing orders 
from the JDA. In an effort to reduce costs, a company will collaborate with a U.S. 
company. This movement intends to keep costs down as well as improve the level of 
technology. The number of companies choosing partnership with U.S. companies is 
likely to increase. 
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IV. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE CONTINUED EVOLUTION 
AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE JDIB 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The difficulties the JDIB is encountering appear to stem from external factors, 
such as the current curtailment of the defense budget, the export ban on defense products 
and kokusanka. The Japanese government historically maintains the policy that keeps the 
SDF minimum scale in order to not threaten neighboring countries. At the same time, the 
government expects the JDIB not to play a major role in the world defense markets. 
The decreasing defense budget clearly makes it difficult to maintain the JDIB in 
traditional ways, such as the JDA allocating a certain amount of the procurement budgets 
to purchase costly indigenous products instead of prohibiting the export of defense 
equipment. This chapter examines the apparent contradiction between the zero-growth 
policy and a desire to maintain autarky in the defense production of major defense 
systems as well as the current sources of defense acquisition including the involvement of 
international defense firms. 
Co-development and co-production of weapons systems with the U.S. is a 
potential method of reducing the JDA’s procurement costs. However, the FS-X program 
has been the only major program. Unfortunately, almost all participants poorly regard the 
FS-X program. This chapter seeks an appropriate method of co-production and 
international cooperation by examining the FS-X case. 
The JDIB has made efforts in response to the JDA’s requirements to reduce the 
unit costs of equipment. However, the market for the JDIB is, in essence, limited to the 
JDA because of the JDIB’s current system. Consequently, continuous cost reduction 
requirements may remove the incentive for the JDIB to remain in the defense business. 
This chapter concludes with an examination of management strategies that may facilitate 
the continuance of the JDIB. 
B. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINMENT OF THE JDIB 
There is a conflict between pursuing international peace and sustaining the JDIB. 
In reference to the former, the Japanese government has used the TPAE and strictly 
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controlled arms exports. The Japanese government has also utilized the kokusanka 
strategy for further indigenous weapons development and production capabilities. When 
considering how to sustain the JDIB, it is essential to clearly state how the Japanese 
government applies the TPAE to technology transfer to the United States. In other words, 
the JDIB will not survive without reconsidering the application of the TPAE. 
The JDIB has been nurtured with the kokusanka strategy, so that Japan is able to 
keep the importation of defense equipment to a minimum, based on defense industry 
being critical to the security of the country. Thus, the Japanese government has accepted 
expensive and lower quality weapons systems made in Japan. However, the JDIB 
currently must face tighten constraints caused by shrinking defense budgets. 
The Japanese government has given fiscal reform first priority, and has not made 
any efforts to sustain the JDIB. The JDA, rather, decided to consider commercially 
available substitutes for equipment designed specifically for defense use. Thus, the 
importance of the JDIB in the defense market is declining. If companies in the JDIB are 
not able to make enough profit, the possibility exists that the incentive to have defense 
divisions may disappear. 
At this stage, obviously the TPAE constraints, while asking the JDIB to produce 
almost all the requirements, has caused considerable concern. Thus, the current downturn 
of the Japanese economy might serve as a catalyst to revise the TPAE. The TPAE 
prevents Japanese companies from exporting weapons and components, and eliminates 
economies of scale in defense production. However, these principles reflect Japan's 
position as a peace-loving nation. [Ref. 4] Put differently, the TPAE is likely to be 
applied based on political reasoning, not economic considerations.  
Although no one in the Japanese government or industry wants to completely 
eliminate the three principles governing weapons exports, there is a movement that calls 
for the Japanese government to be flexible concerning the application of the TPAE. The 
Defense Production Council (DPC) of the Japanese Federation of Economic 
Organizations (Keidanren), a private and non-profit economic organization representing 
virtually all branches of economic activities in Japan, proposed making Japan's arms 
export restrictions more flexible. [Ref. 15] 
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An interesting fact representing the state of current technology can be 
demonstrated. North Korea’s "Yugo" class submarine, which the Korean navy captured 
off the coast of Korea, consisted of over 1,958 items, and 287 of these were made in 
Japan. All of the electronic items, which constituted essential parts of the submarine, 
were made in Japan, and were diverted from non-military Japanese products. [Ref. 36] 
This example proves that some products designed for commercial markets can easily be 
modified as components for a weapon system with minor modifications. Thus, the 
distinction between commercial and military components is nebulous. Japanese 
companies have many advanced technologies, which are applicable to both commercial 
and defense products, and even electronic appliances contain such technologies. 
Therefore, Keidanren, considered to be representing the JDIB, fears that once the 
Japanese government strictly applies the TPAE, their businesses will suffer severely, 
since it will no longer be possible to export products containing advanced technologies to 
any country. In addition, Japanese policymakers worry that U.S. transfers of systems to 
third countries based in part on Japanese technologies constitute arms exports by Japan as 
defined by the TPAE. [Ref. 15] Thus, Japanese firms are prevented from attempting to 
transfer technologies. 
The TPAE also works as a barrier to the development of a company-based 
technology cooperation framework while the Japanese government admits the transfer of 
defense technology to the United States. Under the current interpretation of the TPAE, it 
appears to violate those principles of exporting products produced by U.S. firms that 
incorporate technologies developed by Japanese companies. In this case, Japanese 
companies are not able to expect any benefit from co-development with the United States. 
The METI uses a particular definition for arms: specifically designed parts, 
accessories and finished products used by military forces and directly employed in 
combat. Those items are listed in the export trade control order [Ref. 4] In addition, when 
using the TPAE, all products exported from Japan not to be used as commercial products 
are considered to be arms, which are likely to include commercial items modified for 
defense applications. It is forbidden, on account of this, to export them to the United 
States unless a security treaty is concluded. Items in question, whether they fall under 
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such arms categories or not, will be judged objectively based on shape, features and other 
technical aspects regardless of end use. [Ref. 4] 
In this sense, to facilitate the continuance of the JDIB, the Japanese government is 
required to provide certain considerations. Given the strong pacifist sentiment among the 
Japanese people, it is hard to expect the Japanese government to lift the TPAE or revise it 
in the near future. Therefore, flexible interpretation of the TPAE would be the most 
practical approach. If Japanese companies are allowed to export defense-related products 
more openly, they would be able to freely conduct business with U.S. counterparts. 
Consequently, it is possible that the costs of products manufactured by the JDIB would 
decrease due to economies of scale. 
C. MAJOR SOURCES OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
The weapons systems used by the SDF are procured mainly from five sources 
which are divided into two categories. One is domestic production and the other is 
imports. As for domestic production, the production of domestically developed systems 
(kokusanka), co-developed systems, and licensed production fall into this category. Two 
methods of imports are imports through commercial channels and FMS (Foreign Military 
Sales). 
As shown in Table 4.1, each method has both advantages and disadvantages. 
However, from the standpoint of the Japanese government, domestic production appears 
to be preferred to imports. Furthermore, domestic development, which allows domestic 
manufacturers not only to increase technological expertise but also to keep production 





Table 4.1. Advantage/Disadvantage of Major Sources of Defense Acquisition.  
[After: Ref. 3] 
Category Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s) 
Domestic 
Development 
Suitable for the plan of 
operation 
 
Contribute to sustainment of 
production and technology base 
Technological risks  
Expensive 
Co-development Contribute to sustainment of 
production and technology base 
 










Contribute to sustainment of 
production and technology base 
to some extent 
Difficult to improve 
Commercial 
Import 
Inexpensive in general  
 
No technological risk  
 
Requires shorter time for 
acquisition 
Difficult to improve Imports 
FMS  No contribution to sustainment 
of production and technology 
base to some extent 
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Table 4.2. The Change of The Sources of Procurement (Trillion Yen).  [After: Refs. 
















1950-57 241.5 9.5 2.5 356.9 610.4 39.6
1958-60 278.9 10.9 16.8 140.5 447.1 62.4
1961 70.2 6.3 6.0 26.1 108.6 64.2
1962-66 578.1 42.4 38.2 49.7 708.4 81.6
1966-71 1282.9 66.2 47.8 3.3 1400.2 91.6
1972-76 2155.8 100.1 61.7 0 2320.6 93.0
1977-80 3086.9 139.2 289.4 0 3513.7 88.1
1981-85 5946.6 324.3 433.9 0 6704.6 88.2
1986-90 8067.2 379.9 468.6 0 8915.8 90.5
1991-95 8657.4 534.5 472.5 0 9664.5 89.6
1996 1872.5 93.8 54.1 0 2020.4 92.7
1997 1847.9 117.3 37.6 0 2002.7 92.3
1998 1734.4 112.7 34.8 0 1881.8 92.2
 
In the early period of the SDF, the U.S. government supplied many ships and 
aircraft. They were provided as free loans through the Special Far East Command 
Reserve Program of U.S. Far East Army; this program later migrated to the Military 
Assistance Program (MAP). The total came to 44.9% of total equipment procurement 
between 1950 and 1961. MAP was decreased gradually as the Japanese defense 
production systems were established. Japan received the last weapons under MAP in 
1965. On the other hand, Japan had begun to produce naval combatants in 1953, and 
aircraft in 1954. In 1970, the Japanese government adopted “The Basic Policy for the 
Production and the Development of Equipment in the Domestic Industries”, and 
accelerated the research, development and production of defense equipment. [Ref. 12] 
The ratio of indigenous products has been almost 90% since the late 1960s. 
However, in reality, many of the major systems are composed of licensed products. 
While much equipment for the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), such as tanks and 
armored vehicles, have been developed and manufactured by the JDIB, the development 
of more sophisticated and complicated systems, such as aircraft and missiles, have greatly 
depended on the technologies transferred from the U.S. In other words, the truth of the 
matter is, the JDIB does not have enough capabilities to fulfill all the requirements of the 
JDA; this is most evident in the development of complex weapons systems, such as the 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), the AWACS airborne early warning system, F-
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2 fighter aircraft, and the AEGIS guided missile cruiser. All of these are either being 
produced through licenses, imported, or jointly developed with the U.S. 
The JDA has faced tighten budget constraints since the mid-1990s. This constraint 
may increase the motivation to pursue less expensive procurement methods, such as off-
the-shelf purchases, and cost sharing through joint development and production with the 
U.S. The current Mid Term Defense Program indicates that indigenous products are the 
first priority.  The JDA announced that, with regard to procurement sources, such as an 
aircraft or a naval combatant, the JDA has attached great importance to domestic 
development from the viewpoint of developing the defense industry. However, the JDA 
will promote imports to keep supply costs down. However, the tendency to field domestic 
products will continue for a certain period of time unless the JDA conducts a fundamental 
revision of the SDF structure because, in general, defense programs mature over a long 
period.  
D. THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
The Japanese and U.S. governments created a group known as the Systems and 
Technology Forum (S&TF) in 1980. The purpose of this forum is to facilitate cooperation 
between the U.S. DoD and JDA in the development of defense technologies. Although 
technology transfer from the U.S. to Japan has ordinarily been in the form of licensed 
productions, the S&TF creates new mechanisms for the transfer of technology between 
two countries. 
The Japanese government also decided in 1983 to pave the way for the transfer of 
its military technology to the United States as an exception to the Three Principles on 
Arms Exports. [Ref. 2] Technology transfer to the United States began with a portable 
SAM technology and construction technology for U.S. naval vessels. The FS-X program 
is also considered a part of technology transfer. In addition, the S&TF has spawned the 
nine programs listed below. 
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Table 4.3. Collaborative Technology Projects. [From: Ref. 38] 
Program Years Cost Description 
Ducted Rocket Engine 1992- present $30 million 
Five-year program between the U.S. army and Japan’s 
Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) 
developed and ground tested a flight-weight ducted engine. 
Advanced Steel Technology  1995- 2001 $35 million 
U.S. Navy-TRDI project developed new methods for 
welding high strength steels 
Fighting Vehicle Propulsion 
Using Ceramic Materials 
1996- 
present $26 million 
U.S. army Tank-automotive and Armament Command and 
TRDI project aims to develop diesel engine technology for 
vehicles 
Eye-Safe Laser Radar 1996- 2001 $20 million 
U.S. army Communication and Electronics Command-
TRDI project developed and tested a demonstrator 
multifunction eye-safe laser radar system capable of 3-D 
imaging 
ACES II Ejection Seat 
Modification 
1998- 
2002 $50 million 
U.S. air force-Japan Air Self Defense Force project 
developed a modification kit for ACES II pilot ejection 
seat. 
Advanced Hybrid Technologies 1998- present $18 million 
U.S. Air Force, USAF Research Laboratory, Japan 
Propulsion Defense Agency and TRDI are conducting 
research and exploratory development of advanced hybrid 
rocket engine. 






U.S. navy-TRDI project aims to improve understanding 
and prediction of shallow-water acoustic signal properties. 






Requirement analysis and design for anti-ballistic missile 
components. A potential application is the future SM-3 
Block II missile. 
Low Vulnerability Ammunition 1999- present 
$1.4 
million 
U.S. Army and TRDI program seeks to develop low cost, 
reduced sensitivity energetics for use as propellant in 
artillery systems. 
 
Although it is possible to say that the S&TF has been beneficial, unlike the FS-X 
project, S&TF activities focus on individual interests to suit the occasion. The dialogue 
on common interests in defense requirements and cooperation on future acquisitions 
evident in NATO has been all but absent between the U.S. and Japan. [Ref. 39] 
The United States and Japan are now considering restructuring the S&TF. Both 
countries intend to revamp this framework so that it can enable broader cooperation. 
Although both countries have utilized the S&TF as a framework for cooperation narrowly 
focused on research and development, “one goal of the reorganization is to establish 
regular communication between military personnel from both countries responsible for 
outlining new weapon requirements.” [Ref. 38] By establishing such a framework, it is 
expected that both countries will be able to recognize the common requirements as early 
as possible. 
There is another issue to be considered. It is hardly possible to consider the JDIB 
in this framework.  The JDIB should play a major role in cooperative technology transfer. 
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The reasons are, first, the constraints imposed by Japanese legislation and policy; second, 
a lack of structure to encourage companies to join cooperative projects; and finally, the 
lack of incentives to share technologies. As for the constraints, the risk that core 
businesses might be jeopardized always exists. As regarding structure and the lack of 
incentives, if the Japanese government does not take the initiative, Japanese firms will 
hardly benefit from cooperative programs. To Japanese companies, technologies are 
valuable products derived at their own expense. The lack of an appropriate structure for 
promoting participation by Japanese companies may weaken technology transfer 
programs, since the main R & D efforts are undertaken by commercial entities sponsored 
by those companies. 
E. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FS-X (F-2) CASE 
1. Background 
The production of the FS-X (F-2) is the result of the first joint fighter 
development program between Japan and the United States. The program began with the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Japanese government and the 
United States. Although the F-2 was developed through cooperation between Japan and 
the United States, the fighter was to be used exclusively by the Japan Air Self Defense 
Force. The program was completely funded by Japan. The F-2 (FS-X) was developed by 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries which was the main contractor. KHI, FHI, and Lockheed 
Martin were principal subcontractors.  
In 1981, the JDA started a development program to replace the aging F-1 fighter, 
which was produced by MHI. This program, reflecting kokusanka strategy, basically was 
intended to develop the next-generation fighter aircraft on its own, except for the engines. 
However, by late 1986, as a result of a lot of pressure from the United States, the program 
shifted in modifying the F-16. 
By the 1980s, Japanese had recognized some challenges regarding licensed 
production which included: 
• The U.S.’s attitude of protection of sophisticated technologies 
• Licensing in which the licensor becomes dependent on the licensee 
• Licensing which makes upgrading difficult 
Each of these arguments reflects that licensed production inhibits autonomy.  
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The Japanese industry has produced a variety of weapons under license. However, 
this was by no means a method for obtaining advanced military products and 
technologies. As Japanese companies were convinced that they were capable of 
producing fighter aircraft, Japanese companies and policy makers felt a desire for “pure” 
kokusanka. This movement toward achieving autonomy resulted in the controversial FS-
X (F-2) program. 
The FS-X began to be examined when Japanese companies started to join 
international co-production programs for commercial aircraft. The Japanese aerospace 
industry had proven that it had obtained a certain technology level through various 
licensed production programs. For Japan, this was a chance to end the dependency on the 
United States for defense technologies and reinforce the domestic defense industrial base. 
However, from the U.S. standpoint, allowing Japan to produce fighter aircraft was 
not necessarily preferable. The U.S. aerospace industry felt that the emerging military 
aircraft supplier might ruin the U.S. advantage in commercial aircraft and increase 
competition in the market. The U.S. government expressed a concern about the 
widespread proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems. In addition to those concerns, 
the link with trade problems made matters worse. At that time, since a huge trade 
imbalance existed between the U.S. and Japan, Japan’s desire to develop indigenous 
fighter aircraft was strongly rejected in the United States.  
The first FS-X (prototype) was rolled out and made its first flight in 1995. The 
Japanese congress approved the production program in mid 1996. The deployment of the 
F-2 began in 2000 and the Japanese government plans to field 130 F-2s. 
2. The Result of FS-X Program 
There is no doubt that the FS-X program helped to strengthen Japan's aerospace 
industry. Thanks to this program, the Japanese obtained valuable design and systems 
integration experience applicable to other aircraft projects. Through the program, Japan 
was able to make the most of domestic design concepts and technologies by modifying 
the F-16 drastically. Both U.S. and Japanese officials admitted that Japan's aircraft 
engineers are improving their skills by designing and developing the FS-X fighter aircraft. 
[Ref. 40] In this sense, this program contributes, to some extent, to improving and 
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enhancing the level of Japanese technologies, and to strengthening their industrial 
competitiveness.  
On the other hand, the United States gained not only economic benefits but also 
advanced technology. As for economic value for the United States, it is said to be an 
estimated $4.1 billion, which is approximately a 40% of the share if the Japanese fully 
implement the planned production of 130 aircraft. At the same time, Lockheed Martin, 
which is one of the subcontractors, has transferred composite design and manufacturing 
processes from MHI. Lockheed Martin officials indicated that tooling techniques from 
the F-2 program are being applied to the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program [Ref. 
41] 
Both Japan and the United States benefit from this program. However, in general, 
the public does not hold the FS-X program in high regard. Both sides are frustrated 
because they were not able to obtain what they expected from this program because of a 
lack of communication in defining common interests. Thus, the Japanese wanted to 
maximize modifications to the base line F-16, while the United States sought a 
cooperatively developed FS-X based on a minimally modified base aircraft. Moreover, 
since the United States used the transformation of required technologies, for example, 
engines or source code, as a way to obtain a compromise from Japan, the experience of 
co-development of the FS-X, ironically, strengthens the case for technological autonomy. 
As a result, a feeling that Japan was forced into a joint program by the United States was 
popular among Japanese at that time. A JDA official recalled “I thought nothing could be 
done until we possessed the requisite technological capability ourselves.” [Ref. 42]  
Most of the trouble seems to have resulted from the different interests of the two 
countries toward the program. Since little common interest existed, a national security 
issue was biased, in large part, by economic concerns--a mentality that “they” obtained 
more than “we” did. The underestimation of the United States of how serious Japan was 
about kokusanka also contributed to this problem. Unlike today, Japan’s growing 
economy made the Japanese confident that they could produce indigenous fighter aircraft. 
Even under the current severe economic conditions, Japan is still persisting in kokusanka 
as seen from its decision on development of the PX and CX. 
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Before this program, both countries had concluded the technology transfer 
agreement in 1983. Consequently, Japan decided to release its defense technology to the 
U.S. as an exception to the TPAE. The FS-X case was a test of the agreement as well as 
the first major joint development program. Different from other research projects, this 
program endeavored to generate the prospects of a ready application, which seems too 
large in scale and complicated to manage without mutual understanding and experience.  
The following issues warrant attention to so as to avoid the conflicts associated 
with joint programs in the future. First, every party concerned must define their interests 
in equipment and technology before the programs are begun. In the case of the FS-X, 
differences in interests caused disputes and resulted in unpleasant feelings. Second, a “big 
picture” attitude must be taken that technology transfers during programs will reinforce 
the technological expertise of both countries. Given a decreased market for defense 
equipment, technological exchanges will result in benefits to the defense industries of the 
two countries. 
F. MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES THAT FACILITATE SUSTAINMENT 
The Japanese government, rather, should make more of an effort to emphasize the 
positive aspects of technology transfer to the United States in order to lessen the 
sensitivity of the Japanese public on this issue. Historically, the Japanese government has 
been indecisive about defense matters due to the no-war clause in the Constitution. As a 
result, many Cold War defense practices continue today. However, political leadership 
has rejected making a positive statement that would enable Japan to revise such old 
practices. Thus, the Japanese government and most policy makers have hesitated to alter 
their practices. 
To sustain the JDIB, the TPAE and kokusanka must be revised. The JDIB is 
suffering as a result of current policies. Indeed, some defense industry businesses are 
saying that it is impossible to do business under the existing system with JDA efforts to 
reduce procurement expenditures. [Ref. 18] The external conditions affecting the JDIB, 
such as the TPAE, kokusanka, and the declining budget, are extremely burdensome. The 
TPAE eliminates potential business opportunities in foreign markets. Kokusanka requires 
scarce resources to be spread unnecessarily over a wide range of weapons systems in 
order to fulfill the needs of the SDF. At the same time, the decreasing defense budget 
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requires the JDIB to cut the unit price of equipment while reducing the level of 
production. Thus, it is clearly impossible to maintain the JDIB while all these negative 
factors affecting it. 
Given the ambiguity of commercial vs. military categories, the TPAE is not 
necessarily effective in preventing proliferation of weapons. On the contrary, it becomes 
obvious that the continued use of the TPAE is harming not only the JDIB but also the 
core businesses of Japanese companies. Given the strong pacifist mentality among the 
Japanese public, the TPAE is likely to continue. At the same time, because defense 
production is not the core business for Japanese companies, unnecessary and unfavorable 
criticism associated with defense matters may seriously damage their main businesses. It 
is hard to imagine that Japanese companies would export products and technologies 
indiscriminately even if the TPAE were lifted.  
It is to be expected that the market for the JDIB is likely to increase where 
technology transfer with the United States is concerned. If Japanese companies actively 
do business with the United States, the unit costs of equipment for the JDA may decrease 
to some extent. A secondary effect may be the increase in interoperability between the 
SDF and U.S. forces. To promote this transfer of technology, the Japanese government, at 
least, must not stretch the interpretation of the TPAE. If at all possible, the Japanese 
government should announce that export destined for the United States is not restricted. 
This policy should indicate commercial items suitable for defense applications with 
minor modifications for defense applications.  
G. SUMMARY 
The JDIB is composed of private companies but the Japanese government 
controls almost all JDIB activities. Those who intend to produce aircraft and weapons 
must obtain permission from the government and the products are principally supplied to 
the JDA. It is not clear whether the JDIB can export any defense related products and 
comply with the TPAE. Since the TPAE has not been clarified, Japanese companies 
cannot be confident that their products are categorized as commercial. Once an item is 
categorized as not for commercial use, that item may not be exported. 
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At the same time, there has been a framework to facilitate the development of 
defense technologies between Japan and the United States. However, the main players are 
government organizations in both countries. Given that almost all Japanese defense 
technologies are developed by the JIDB, some measures to encourage Japanese 
companies to join such frameworks must be created. Otherwise, they will remain hesitant 
to participate in cooperative technology projects due to the bitter experiences of the FS-X 
program. It goes without saying that the Japanese government must state the goals and 
then convince Japanese companies that international cooperation reinforces their 
technological expertise. 
To enable the JDIB to survive, the Japanese government must revise the TPAE 
and kokusanka. The TPAE eliminates business opportunities in foreign markets. At the 
same time, given the vagueness in the distinction between commercial and defense 
technology, the TPAE may limit the commercial export activities of Japanese companies. 
With the reduced volume of JDA procurement, a burden is placed on the JDIB. Japanese 
companies are expected to maintain defense production capabilities regardless of profits. 
The Japanese government must therefore understand that the current system may severely 
damage the JDIB. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes all the studies conducted in the previous chapters. It also 
contains the conclusions, recommendations, and areas of further research that should be 
considered with regards to the JDIB and its sustainment. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The JDA’s purchasing power is deflated by the kokusanka strategy. Since the 
budget of the JDA is closely tied to the national GDP, it is difficult to expect that defense 
expenditures would increase drastically under the current economic situation. To keep up 
with expanding requirements, the JDA must reconsider its weapons systems. The recent 
MTDP shows the need for new capabilities to cope with this new environment. When 
looking at a purchase list in the MTDP, the items to be procured in the near future are not 
very different from those of the Cold War era. 
The JDA is reducing the volume of procurement. As a result, the product 
opportunities for the JDIB become smaller and smaller each year. This situation 
undermines the rationale for attracting Japanese companies to engage in the defense 
business. In other words, companies do not have opportunities that may contribute to 
their technological expertise. Given that Japanese companies are not dependent on 
defense business, and they are also facing difficulties in the commercial sector due to the 
economic slump in other countries, withdrawal of companies from the defense sector is a 
possibility. 
The JDA also strives to reduce unit costs through procurement reform. Those 
efforts are focusing solely on domestic factors. However, it is not certain whether those 
efforts will lead to a significant decrease in costs.  Or, since the high prices of defense 
equipment in Japan are generally regarded to be a result of domestic production, it is 
natural to think that such efforts will not provide drastic cost reductions. Rather, Japanese 
companies may leave the defense sector due to the loss of incentives.  
The development program to replace the P-3C patrol aircraft and C-1 transport 
aircraft is listed on the current MTDP. Thus, the JDA has not completely abandoned its 
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kokusanka strategy even though kokusanka is an expensive approach to weapons 
development. Although the JDA plans to hold down unit costs by sharing some 
components between the two aircrafts, it is very unlikely that the JDA will be able to 
achieve its objective on costs since the total number of aircraft to be procured is still 
small. The JDA has approximately 100 P-3Cs and 30 C-1s. Given this number, their 
replacements will almost number 130. 
Although there is a framework that attempts to promote technological cooperation 
with the U.S., it has not led to a major cooperative program thus far. Instead, the 
experience of both countries was the FX-S program. This program caused disputes due to 
a lack of dialogue in the early stage of this Japanese originated program, differences in 
interests, and so forth. Many points needed to be resolved in this program. On the 
contrary, cooperative programs provided by the ST&F appear to be very successful. 
These programs are small and less complex when compared to the FS-X, focus on 
specific interests, and unlike the FS-X program, are for research and development. Thus, 
the outcomes from these programs are less likely to be incorporated into a system to be 
fielded immediately after the completion of the program. 
It must be noted that the Japanese arms export control policy raises a complicated 
issue in the technological cooperation between Japan and the U.S. Since the Japanese 
government prohibits the export of arms to any country, Japanese companies are reluctant 
to fully commit to international technological cooperative programs. This policy 
eliminates the opportunity to share the costs of weapons systems development and 
production with another country. International cooperation in the defense sector seems to 
be the obvious trend since many countries are suffering from a decrease in defense 
budgets. In other words, indigenous productions of large-scale weapons systems are 
becoming unrealistic. 
Given recent decrease in the budget, maintaining the JDIB seems to be difficult 
under the current TPAE and kokusanka strategy. While the JDA may not be able to 
continue to order various items with enough volume when asking to keep costs down, 
Kokusanka requires Japanese companies to allocate a certain amount of resources to non-
core businesses in order to maintain production capabilities. At the same time, the 
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markets for the JDIB are basically limited to the JDA. Thus, the defense business for 
Japanese companies would turn into an unnecessary business rather than an odd business. 
To avoid such a situation, the Japanese government needs to revise and adjust its posture 
on defense production. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
1. Diversification of Procurement Source 
It is inconsistent with reality to fulfill all JDA requirements from the JDIB as was 
done in the past. It is true that having defense production capabilities domestically 
alleviate the vulnerability caused by dependency on foreign suppliers. But it is also 
proved through the example of kokusanka that indigenous production is costly since there 
are no economies of scale. Therefore, The JDA must think of foreign suppliers as one 
alternative source of procurement without continuing kokusanka as a prime source of 
procurement. As national security is viewed based on an international framework, it is 
practical to purchase “off-the-shelf” equipment at reasonable prices. Relaxing kokusanka 
strategy may lead to a large reduction in costs. Then, the required funds to maintain some 
critical defense industrial activities could be financed. The JDA should closely examine 
to what extent defense production should be accomplished by the JDIB.  
2. Lowering the Barrier 
The Japanese government must create a structure that enables companies to 
engage in international cooperative programs. It is clear the most current constraint is the 
TPAE which makes defense business with foreign countries risky. To lower the barriers 
to engaging in such activities, Japanese government (METI) should take into account the 
benefits of technology exchanges with the U.S. and interpret the TPAE in a flexible 
manner. Export of commercial products incorporating a technology that can divert 
defense products with minor modification is not restricted and may encourage industry-
industry collaboration. 
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
To encourage Japanese companies in Japan-U.S. technological cooperation, the 
following issues should be considered. 
• Technology transfer and the protection of intellectual rights of private 
companies 
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• The benefits the U.S. defense industry base gain through technological 
cooperation with Japan 
• The effects on the U.S.-Japan security alliance for technological 
cooperation 
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